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I. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

In his brief, Respondent Jerry Judd (hereinafter referred to as "Judd") addresses
issues raised by Appellant Kootenai County (hereinafter referred to as "the County") in
its opening brief, and also presents argument on additional issues. This reply brief will
provide additional argument on the issue concerning the District Court's decision
regarding augmentation of the record in the appeal below, and will otherwise be limited
to rebuttal on the additional issues which Judd has raised.

A.

There was no basis for the District Court to augment the record in the
appeal below under Idaho Code§ 67-5276.
For the reasons stated in its opening brief, the County disagrees with Judd's

statement that Rule 84(1'.) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to the
motion for augmentation of the agency record which the District Court granted in the
appeal below. Judd does correctly point out, however, that Idaho Code§ 67-5276 also
applies to the District Court's determination as to whether an agency record may be
augmented with additional evidence.

This statute, which was cited in the County's

opening brief, reads in its entirety as follows:
67-5276. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE. (1) If, before the date set for
hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present additional
evidence and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional
evidence is material, relates to the validity of the agency action, and that:
(a) there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding
before the agency, the court may remand the matter to the agency with
directions that the agency receive additional evidence and conduct
additional factfinding.

1

(b) there were alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency,
the court may take proof on the matter.
(2) The agency may modify its action by reason of the additional evidence
and shall file any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the
reviewing court.
Idaho Code § 67-5276.
The County has pointed out in its opening brief that the lacaboni application is
not material to judicial review of the decision of the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") in this matter, and does not
relate to the validity of that decision: Nevertheless, even if this Court were to find that
the application was material and did relate to the validity of the Board's decision, the
District Court still erred in granting Judd's motion to augment the record because it
failed to follow the plain language of Idaho Code§ 67-5276(1 ).
If the evidence sought to be added to the record via a motion to augment is found
to be material and is also found to relate to the validity of the local governing body's
decision, the reviewing court must then find that "there were good reasons for failure to
present it in the proceeding" before the local governing body. Idaho Code § 67-5276.
Here, Judd argues that this is the case because the Jacaboni matter had not been
decided at the time the decision in this matter was made, but this is actually one of the
reasons why the District Court should not have augmented the record with the Jacaboni
application.

The Board made its decision in this matter before it had even had the

opportunity to consider the evidence relevant to the lacaboni variance application.
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Even if this Court were to uphold the District Court's finding that there were good
reasons for failure to present the lacaboni application in this proceeding, Idaho Code
§ 67-5276(1) unambiguously states that the proper action would have been to "remand

the matter to the [Board] with directions that the [Board] receive additional evidence and
conduct additional factfinding." 1 This was not done here.

Instead, the District Court

itself received the additional evidence and conducted the additional fact finding, which
was clearly improper.

If the District Court believed that the lacaboni decision was

relevant to this matter, it should have remanded this matter to the Board with
instructions to reconsider its decision in light of its subsequent decision in /acaboni. The
failure of the District Court to do so requires, at the very least, that its decision in this
matter should be vacated.

B.

The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed
evidence in the record.
Judd's brief emphasizes the argument that there was no evidence supporting the

Board's decision to deny his variance application. To the contrary, the Board's decision
in this matter was supported by substantial, undisputed evidence in the record before it.
That evidence showed that Judd had built structures within twenty-five feet (25') of the
-

shoreline of Lake Coeur d'Alene without first obtaining a variance or a building permit,
both of which were required for construction to take place. The Board found that, based

1

Judd does not appear to be arguing that the /acaboni application would be relevant to whether there
were alleged irregularities in procedure before the Board in this matter. See Respondents' Brief at 11-13.
If that were the case, the District Court could have directly taken and considered such evidence, as
provided in Idaho Code§ 67-5276(1 )(b).
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on this evidence and particularly due to the proximity of the encroachment to the
shoreline of Lake Coeur d'Alene, that Judd had failed to show that the requested
variance would not be in conflict with the public interest.
The District Court recognized that these facts were undisputed, but then
inappropriately acted as a finder of fact in finding that those facts were not relevant in
determining whether the proposed variance was, or was not, in conflict with the public
interest. (See Dist Ct. Tr. p. 49 L. 5 through p. 51 L. 25.)

Under Idaho Code§ 67-

6516, however, this is a determination left to the discretion of the Board - not to the
District Court on judicial review. See Marcia T. Turner, L.L.C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144
Idaho 203, 211-12, 159 P.3d 840, 848-49 (2007) (pointing out that use of word "may"
imparted discretion to governing board in granting or denying permits). This discretion
allows a local governing body to deny a permit application even if no one testified
againstit. Id. at 212, 159 P .3d at 849.
Thus, contrary to Judd's arguments and the District Court's findings, the record is
not devoid of evidence supporting the Board's decision in this matter. The evidence is
present, but the District Court simply ignored it in making its own decision, improperly
substituting its judgment for that of the Board.

That decision would paradoxically

require the Board to approve a variance application as a matter of law whenever the
structure which was the subject of the variance has already been unlawfully built, while
allowing the Board the discretion to deny such a variance request if the structure has
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not yet been built. Therefore, the decision of the District Court should be vacated, and
the decision of the Board should be affirmed.
C.

The Board did not deprive Judd of procedural due process, nor was its
decision based upon unlawful procedure.

Judd also argues that the decision of the Board was based upon unlawful
procedure, based on excerpts of the transcript of the Board's public hearing in this
matter which have been reproduced in his brief.

None of these excerpts, however,

show that the Board denied due process to Judd, nor do they show that the decision of
the Board was based on unlawful procedure.
Judd's argument is based on an alleged denial of due process resulting from the
Board's decision to obtain information from the Kootenai County Assessor's Office
concerning whether the Judd property was classified as "buildable" or "non-buildable"
for assessment purposes. (See Combined Tr. 2 p. 35, L. 17 through p. 37, L. 23; p. 40,
L. 2 through p. 41, L. 25; p. 44, L. 23 through p. 47, L. 13.) This information was

requested of staff after the public hearing was initially closed and the Board had
commenced with its deliberations, when the Board indicated that it wanted to ascertain
whether Judd had been placed on notice as to any limitations on the lawful use and
development of the property which may have been reflected in the Kootenai County
Assessor's valuation. (Id.)

2

For the sake of consistency with the references cited in Respondents' Brief, citations to the transcript will
refer to the transcript of the hearings held before the Board in this matter and in two other matters heard
simultaneously (Wohr/e and Baycroft) on June 1, 2006, in their entirety. This transcript was filed with the
District Court on January 23, 2007. References to this transcript will use the abbreviation "Combined Tr."
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After obtaining the document pertaining to the Judd property, the Board briefly
read and discussed it. (Combined Tr. p. 40, L. 2-24; p. 41, L. 1-19.) Upon advice of
counsel, the Board then re-opened the public hearing in this case in order to officially
admit this document into the record and to afford Judd an opportunity to review the
document and provide a response. (Combined Tr. p. 41, L. 20-25; p. 44, L. 23-25; p.
45, L. 1-6.) Judd did in fact respond. (Combined Tr. p. 45, L. 7 through p. 47, L. 3.)
This process was completed in one day in large part as an accommodation to Judd,
who had come from Spokane, Washington to be present at that hearing. (Combined Tr.
p. 36, L. 8-12; p. 37, L. 1-8.)

In so doing, Judd did not object to the Board's

consideration of that document at that time, and did not request additional time for
rebuttal. (See Combined Tr. p. 45, L. 7 through p. 47, L. 3.)
Idaho case law is clear that consideration of a variance request involves the
quasi-judicial function of a local . governing body, where due process requirements
apply. See, e.g., Evans v. Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 432-33, 50 P.3d 443, 447-48
(2002). Judd has cited Chambers v. Kootenai County, 125 Idaho 115, 867 P.2d 989
(1994), in support of the contention that he was denied due process as a result of
introduction of new evidence.
Chambers involved a decision made after considering evidence not introduced

into the record at a public hearing. Chambers, 125 Idaho at 118,867 P.2d at 992. The
Chambers Court stated that a governing board, when conducting a quasi-judicial

proceeding considering a zoning-related issue, must a) provide notice of meetings
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where the matter is considered, whether the meeting is a public hearing or a meeting for
deliberations, b) provide a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings, and c)
make specific findings of facts and conclusions upon which the decision was based. Id.
These requirements also imply the opportunity to present and rebut evidence. Id.
This case, however, may be distinguished from Chambers.

In Chambers, the

county commissioners had based their decision at least in part on evidence which had
not been received during the course of any public hearing. The Court found that this
had served to deny the right to notice and an opportunity to respond to the new
evidence.

See id.

Here, the Board re-opened the public hearing in order to admit

additional evidence into the record and to give Judd the opportunity to review that
evidence and provide an opportunity to respond - the very due process rights to which
the Chambers Court stated they should be entitled.
A court reviewing a decision ofa local governing body under the Local Land.Use
Planning Act, Idaho Code§ 67-6501 et seq., is required to "consider the proceedings as
a whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of
practical considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of
reasoned decision-making." Idaho Code§ 67-6535; Evans, 137 Idaho at 433, 50 P.3d
at 448. In this case, the Board was not acting upon a cold appellate record to make its
decision; rather, it heard the application in a de nova proceeding and was the original
deciding body, as hearing examiners in Kootenai County act strictly in an advisory
capacity. See Kootenai County Code§§ 2-1-2(G), 2-1-3(0). In that capacity, the Board
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received testimony and evidence in addition to that considered by the hearing examiner
(including Judd's testimony, and evidence introduced by, or favorable to, Judd).
Judd also argues that certain comments by then-Commissioner Gus Johnson
constituted a deprivation of due process because they deprived Judd of a meaningful
opportunity to rebut those comments. First of all, it must be noted that Judd was given
the opportunity to respond to those comments, and did not request additional time to do
so. Secondly, it appears that Judd is actually arguing that these comments indicated
that then-Commissioner Johnson was not acting in an impartial manner, as required in
quasi-judicial proceedings of a local governing body.
This Court has defined "impartiality" as "the lack of bias for or against either party
to the proceeding." Turner, 144 Idaho at 209, 159 P.3d at 846. On the other hand,
"impartiality" does not mean "lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular
legal view," nor . does it "guarantee each litigant a chance of changing the .[decision
maker's] preconceived view of the law." Id. "Impartiality" simply means that a decision
maker is "willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions," and to remain
"open to persuasion." Id. Furthermore, a member of a local governing body cannot be
deemed to lack impartiality simply because he or she "has taken a position, even in
public, on a policy issue related to the dispute, in the absence of a showing that [he or
she] is not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own
circumstances." Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 785, 86 P.3d 494, 499 (2004)
(quotations omitted).
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Here, there is no showing that then-Commissioner Johnson was incapable of
fairly making a decision in this matter on the basis of its own circumstances - he simply
requested additional information which had not been provided by staff, explained why
he had requested that information, and gave Judd an opportunity to respond.
(Combined Tr. p. 35, L. 17 through p. 37, L. 23; p. 40, L. 2 through p. 41, L. 25; p. 44, L.
23 through p. 47, L. 13.)

In addition, the Board's ultimate decision to deny Judd's

variance request did not turn on the assessment of the property as a "buildable" parcel
or as a "non-buildable" parcel. (AR. at 180-84; Combined Tr. p. 53, L. 7-25; p. 54, L. 123.) As discussed above and in the County's opening brief, there was other substantial
evidence presented at the hearing upon which the Board based its decision even if it
had not considered the document derived from the Assessor's records. In addition, as
discussed above, interested persons were provided a fair opportunity to present and
rebut .this evidence once the public hearing was reopened. Cf. Evans, 137 Idaho at
433, 50 P.3d at 448.
For these reasons, the Board's decision was not based upon unlawful procedure,
and the District Court stopped short of finding that a deprivation of Judd's due process
had occurred. (See Dist. Ct. Tr. p. 49, L. 12-18.) Therefore, the decision of the District
Court should be vacated, and the decision of the Board should be affirmed. Even if this
Court were to find that this portion of the proceeding were procedurally defective, the
Board's decision should nevertheless be affirmed because the reasoning behind the
Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the remainder of the record.
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D.

Judd is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
In its opening brief, the County argued that this Court should vacate the District

Court's award of costs and attorney fees to Judd in the appeal below. As stated in that
brief, the same arguments apply to Judd's request for this Court to award attorney fees
to Judd on appeal.
These arguments may be summarized as follows.

First, Judd should not be

considered a prevailing party for the reasons stated in this brief and in the County's
opening brief. Secondly, the Board acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law, thus
precluding an award of attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-117 even if
Judd were deemed to have prevailed, or to have prevailed in part.
For these reasons, as set forth in detail in the County's opening brief and as
summarized here, this Court should decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

II. CONC.LU.S.ION
Idaho Code § 67-5276 did not provide a basis for the District Court to grant
Judd's motion to augment the record in the appeal below because it was not material,
did not relate to the validity of the Board's decision in this matter, and because good
reasons for failure to present ii in the proceeding before the agency did not exist. Even
if a basis existed to augment the record, the District Court erred by failing to remand this
matter to the Board for further consideration in light of its decision in lacaboni.
The decision of the Board was supported by substantial, undisputed evidence in
the record, consisting of the unlawful building engaged in by Judd before coming to the
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County for forgiveness, when Judd should have come to the County beforehand for
permission in the form of a variance, and then a building permit. The District Court
ignored this evidence, and substituted its judgment for that of the Board, in finding that
this evidence could not provide a basis for the Board's decision.
The Board did not deprive Judd of procedural due process, and did not make its
decision based upon unlawful procedure, in obtaining and considering additional
evidence not initially provided during the course of the public hearing held in this matter
and allowing Judd to respond to that evidence. This is particularly true because this
information was not the Board's primary consideration in making its decision, and
because then-Commissioner Johnson's comments do not support a finding that he was
not acting as an impartial decision maker.
Finally, Judd should not be awarded attorney fees on appeal because it should
not beJound to be. the prevailing party in this appeal. Even if Judd were.found. to be. the
prevailing party, Judd should not be awarded attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code
§ 12-117 because the Board acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law in making its
decision in this matter.
Dated this

~c'Y111._

day of April, 2008.
Kootenai County Department
of Administrative Services

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Appellant
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